在 Windows 10 x64 20H2 上的 Visual Studio 2019 中，我试图挂钩我没有 lib 或包含文件的 DLL 的导出函数。虽然我过去成功使用过 MinHook 数百次，但它总是使用我拥有 lib 和包含文件的函数。我想知道需要什么来阻止钩子触发崩溃。
当我的钩子函数执行器出现此错误：
Microsoft Visual C++ 运行时库调试错误！
程序：HookingModule.dll 模块：HookingModule.dll 文件：
运行时检查失败 #0 - ESP 的值未在函数调用中正确保存。这通常是调用使用一种调用约定声明的函数和使用另一种调用约定声明的函数指针的结果。
现在我知道这通常表明与不正确的调用约定挂钩。据我所知，我正在挂钩的函数是 WndProc 处理程序并使用 __stdcall。被钩子函数的反汇编是：
函数的开始：
.text:009A14E0 55 push ebp
.text:009A14E1 8B EC mov ebp, esp
.text:009A14E3 81 EC BC 02 00 00 sub esp, 2BCh
.text:009A14E9 8B 45 0C mov eax, [ebp+Msg]
.text:009A14EC 89 85 64 FD FF FF mov [ebp+var_29C], eax
.text:009A14F2 83 BD 64 FD FF FF 20 cmp [ebp+var_29C], 20h ; ' '
.text:009A14F9 77 3D ja short loc_9A1538
.text:009A14FB 83 BD 64 FD FF FF 20 cmp [ebp+var_29C], 20h ; ' '
.text:009A1502 0F 84 7D 12 00 00 jz loc_9A2785
.text:009A1508 8B 8D 64 FD FF FF mov ecx, [ebp+var_29C]
函数结束：
.text:009A2C35 loc_9A2C35: ; CODE XREF: FN_WindowWnd+1751↑j
.text:009A2C35 8B 4D 08 mov ecx, [ebp+hWndParent]
.text:009A2C38 51 push ecx ; hWnd
.text:009A2C39 E8 02 DC 05 00 call sub_A00840
.text:009A2C3E 83 C4 04 add esp, 4
.text:009A2C41
.text:009A2C41 loc_9A2C41: ; CODE XREF: FN_WindowWnd+1753↑j
.text:009A2C41 8B 45 A0 mov eax, [ebp+var_60]
.text:009A2C44
.text:009A2C44 loc_9A2C44: ; CODE XREF: FN_WindowWnd+351↑j
.text:009A2C44 ; FN_WindowWnd+36D↑j ...
.text:009A2C44 8B E5 mov esp, ebp
.text:009A2C46 5D pop ebp
.text:009A2C47 C2 10 00 retn 10h
我挂钩功能的方式：
typedef LRESULT (*CALLBACK LPFN_WindowWnd)(_In_ HWND hwnd, _In_ UINT uMsg, _In_ WPARAM wParam, _In_ LPARAM lParam);
LPFN_WindowWnd original_FN_WindowWnd;
LRESULT CALLBACK hooked_FN_WindowWnd(_In_ HWND hwnd, _In_ UINT uMsg, _In_ WPARAM wParam, _In_ LPARAM lParam)
{
if (uMsg == WM_GETOBJECT) return 0;
return original_FN_WindowWnd(hwnd, uMsg, wParam, lParam);
}
if (MH_Initialize() != MH_OK)
{
TRACE(L"HOOK INITIALIZATION FAILED!");
return;
}
HMODULE hModule = GetModuleHandleW(L"hookedmodule.dll");
FN_WindowWnd = (LPFN_WindowWnd)GetProcAddress(hModule, "FN_WindowWnd");
if (hModule != NULL)
{
FN_WindowWnd = (LPFN_WindowWnd)GetProcAddress(hModule, "FN_WindowWnd");
TRACE(L"HOOK: Create Hook for pbvm100!FN_WindowWnd");
if (MH_CreateHook(FN_WindowWnd, &hooked_FN_WindowWnd,
reinterpret_cast<LPVOID*>(&original_FN_WindowWnd)) != MH_OK)
{
TRACE(L"CREATE HOOK FAILED!");
}
MH_EnableHook(MH_ALL_HOOKS);
}
这导致以下反汇编，据我所知，这是保存和恢复 ESP。
text:100A4410 ?hooked_FN_WindowWnd@@YGJPAUHWND__@@IIJ@Z proc near
.text:100A4410 ; CODE XREF: hooked_FN_WindowWnd(HWND__ *,uint,uint,long)↑j
.text:100A4410
.text:100A4410 var_C0 = byte ptr -0C0h
.text:100A4410 arg_0 = dword ptr 8
.text:100A4410 arg_4 = dword ptr 0Ch
.text:100A4410 arg_8 = dword ptr 10h
.text:100A4410 arg_C = dword ptr 14h
.text:100A4410
.text:100A4410 push ebp
.text:100A4411 mov ebp, esp
.text:100A4413 sub esp, 0C0h
.text:100A4419 push ebx
.text:100A441A push esi
.text:100A441B push edi
.text:100A441C lea edi, [ebp+var_C0]
.text:100A4422 mov ecx, 30h
.text:100A4427 mov eax, 0CCCCCCCCh
.text:100A442C rep stosd
.text:100A442E mov ecx, offset unk_1021F073
.text:100A4433 call j_@__CheckForDebuggerJustMyCode@4 ; __CheckForDebuggerJustMyCode(x)
.text:100A4438 cmp [ebp+arg_4], 3Dh ; '='
.text:100A443C jnz short loc_100A4442
.text:100A443E xor eax, eax
.text:100A4440 jmp short loc_100A4464
.text:100A4442 ; ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
.text:100A4442
.text:100A4442 loc_100A4442: ; CODE XREF: hooked_FN_WindowWnd(HWND__ *,uint,uint,long)+2C↑j
.text:100A4442 mov esi, esp
.text:100A4444 mov eax, [ebp+arg_C]
.text:100A4447 push eax
.text:100A4448 mov ecx, [ebp+arg_8]
.text:100A444B push ecx
.text:100A444C mov edx, [ebp+arg_4]
.text:100A444F push edx
.text:100A4450 mov eax, [ebp+arg_0]
.text:100A4453 push eax
.text:100A4454 call ?original_FN_WindowWnd@@3P6AHPAUHWND__@@IIJ@ZA ; int (*original_FN_WindowWnd)(HWND__ *,uint,uint,long)
.text:100A445A add esp, 10h
.text:100A445D cmp esi, esp
.text:100A445F call j___RTC_CheckEsp
.text:100A4464
.text:100A4464 loc_100A4464: ; CODE XREF: hooked_FN_WindowWnd(HWND__ *,uint,uint,long)+30↑j
.text:100A4464 pop edi
.text:100A4465 pop esi
.text:100A4466 pop ebx
.text:100A4467 add esp, 0C0h
.text:100A446D cmp ebp, esp
.text:100A446F call j___RTC_CheckEsp
.text:100A4474 mov esp, ebp
.text:100A4476 pop ebp
.text:100A4477 retn 10h
.text:100A4477 ?hooked_FN_WindowWnd@@YGJPAUHWND__@@IIJ@Z endp
在 WinDbg 中，我们可以看到：
钩子函数被命中并继续原来的函数：
1:002> .step_filter "ntdll!*;kernelbase!*;user32!*"
Filter out code symbols matching:
ntdll!*
kernelbase!*
user32!*
1:002> t
eax=7b7ef073 ebx=10b514e0 ecx=7b7ef073 edx=00000001 esi=000f1df6 edi=0019ebf8
eip=7b674438 esp=0019eb2c ebp=0019ebf8 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000246
HookInit32!hooked_FN_WindowWnd+0x28:
7b674438 837d0c3d cmp dword ptr [ebp+0Ch],3Dh ss:002b:0019ec04=00000081
1:002> t
eax=7b7ef073 ebx=10b514e0 ecx=7b7ef073 edx=00000001 esi=000f1df6 edi=0019ebf8
eip=7b674442 esp=0019eb2c ebp=0019ebf8 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz ac pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000216
HookInit32!hooked_FN_WindowWnd+0x32:
7b674442 8bf4 mov esi,esp
1:002> t
eax=000f1df6 ebx=10b514e0 ecx=00000000 edx=00000081 esi=0019eb2c edi=0019ebf8
eip=024a0fe0 esp=0019eb18 ebp=0019ebf8 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz ac pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000216
024a0fe0 55 push ebp
1:002> t
eax=000f1df6 ebx=10b514e0 ecx=00000000 edx=00000081 esi=0019eb2c edi=0019ebf8
eip=024a0fe1 esp=0019eb14 ebp=0019ebf8 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz ac pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000216
024a0fe1 8bec mov ebp,esp
1:002> t
eax=000f1df6 ebx=10b514e0 ecx=00000000 edx=00000081 esi=0019eb2c edi=0019ebf8
eip=024a0fe3 esp=0019eb14 ebp=0019eb14 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz ac pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000216
024a0fe3 81ecbc020000 sub esp,2BCh
1:002> t
eax=000f1df6 ebx=10b514e0 ecx=00000000 edx=00000081 esi=0019eb2c edi=0019ebf8
eip=024a0fe9 esp=0019e858 ebp=0019eb14 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz ac po nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000212
024a0fe9 e9fb046b0e jmp hookedmodule!FN_WindowWnd+0x9 (10b514e9)
1:002> t
eax=000f1df6 ebx=10b514e0 ecx=00000000 edx=00000081 esi=0019eb2c edi=0019ebf8
eip=10b514e9 esp=0019e858 ebp=0019eb14 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz ac po nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000212
hookedmodule!FN_WindowWnd+0x9:
10b514e9 8b450c mov eax,dword ptr [ebp+0Ch] ss:002b:0019eb20=00000081
1:002> t
eax=00000081 ebx=10b514e0 ecx=00000000 edx=00000081 esi=0019eb2c edi=0019ebf8
eip=10b514ec esp=0019e858 ebp=0019eb14 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz ac po nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000212
ETC...
hookedmodule!fn_txnservice_create_instance+0x300f:
10bec77f 52 push edx
1:002> t
eax=00000001 ebx=10b514e0 ecx=0000c000 edx=000f1df6 esi=0019eb2c edi=0019ebf8
eip=10bec780 esp=0019e7b0 ebp=0019e7b8 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na po nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000202
hookedmodule!fn_txnservice_create_instance+0x3010:
10bec780 ff15289ed310 call dword ptr [hookedmodule!getVtableInfo_plugincontextkeyword+0x229b8 (10d39e28)] ds:002b:10d39e28={USER32!GetPropW (756ea160)}
1:002> t
eax=0000c000 ebx=00000000 ecx=ffffe000 edx=000f1df6 esi=000f1df6 edi=00fae220
eip=763810e0 esp=0019e788 ebp=0019e7a8 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000246
win32u!NtUserGetProp:
763810e0 b80e100000 mov eax,100Eh
1:002> t
eax=0000100e ebx=00000000 ecx=ffffe000 edx=000f1df6 esi=000f1df6 edi=00fae220
eip=763810e5 esp=0019e788 ebp=0019e7a8 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000246
win32u!NtUserGetProp+0x5:
763810e5 ba10633876 mov edx,offset win32u!Wow64SystemServiceCall (76386310)
1:002> t
eax=0000100e ebx=00000000 ecx=ffffe000 edx=76386310 esi=000f1df6 edi=00fae220
eip=763810ea esp=0019e788 ebp=0019e7a8 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000246
win32u!NtUserGetProp+0xa:
763810ea ffd2 call edx {win32u!Wow64SystemServiceCall (76386310)}
1:002> t
eax=0000100e ebx=00000000 ecx=ffffe000 edx=76386310 esi=000f1df6 edi=00fae220
eip=76386310 esp=0019e784 ebp=0019e7a8 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000246
win32u!Wow64SystemServiceCall:
76386310 ff25cc703876 jmp dword ptr [win32u!Wow64Transition (763870cc)] ds:002b:763870cc=776a7000
1:002> t
eax=0000100e ebx=00000000 ecx=ffffe000 edx=76386310 esi=000f1df6 edi=00fae220
eip=776a7000 esp=0019e784 ebp=0019e7a8 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000246
776a7000 ea09706a773300 jmp 0033:776A7009
1:002> t
*** The C++ standard library and CRT step filter can be enabled to skip this function. Run .settings set Sources.SkipCrtCode = true to enable it. ***
eax=00000000 ebx=0019dccc ecx=db0544f1 edx=00000000 esi=7b674464 edi=7b657329
eip=7b67728c esp=0019dc54 ebp=0019dc7c iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000246
HookInit32!notify_debugger+0x4c:
7b67728c eb16 jmp HookInit32!notify_debugger+0x64 (7b6772a4)
1:002> t
eax=00000000 ebx=0019dccc ecx=db0544f1 edx=00000000 esi=7b674464 edi=7b657329
eip=7b6772a4 esp=0019dc54 ebp=0019dc7c iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000246
HookInit32!notify_debugger+0x64:
7b6772a4 c745fcfeffffff mov dword ptr [ebp-4],0FFFFFFFEh ss:002b:0019dc78=00000000
1:002> t
eax=00000000 ebx=0019dccc ecx=05a8dc1e edx=00000000 esi=7b674464 edi=7b657329
eip=7b676c16 esp=0019dc84 ebp=0019dca4 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000246
HookInit32!DebuggerProbe+0x26:
7b676c16 83c404 add esp,4
1:002> t
eax=00000000 ebx=0019dccc ecx=05a8dc1e edx=00000000 esi=7b674464 edi=7b657329
eip=7b676c19 esp=0019dc88 ebp=0019dca4 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000206
HookInit32!DebuggerProbe+0x29:
7b676c19 807dff00 cmp byte ptr [ebp-1],0 ss:002b:0019dca3=00
1:002> t
eax=00000000 ebx=0019dccc ecx=05a8dc1e edx=00000000 esi=7b674464 edi=7b657329
eip=7b676c20 esp=0019dc88 ebp=0019dca4 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000246
HookInit32!DebuggerProbe+0x30:
7b676c20 8be5 mov esp,ebp
1:002> t
eax=00000000 ebx=0019dccc ecx=05a8dc1e edx=00000000 esi=7b674464 edi=7b657329
eip=7b67705f esp=0019dcac ebp=0019eaf8 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000246
HookInit32!failwithmessage+0x9f:
7b67705f 83c404 add esp,4
1:002> t
eax=00000000 ebx=0019dccc ecx=05a8dc1e edx=00000000 esi=7b674464 edi=7b657329
eip=7b677088 esp=0019dcb0 ebp=0019eaf8 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000246
HookInit32!failwithmessage+0xc8:
7b677088 b001 mov al,1
1:002> t
eax=00000001 ebx=0019dccc ecx=05a8dc1e edx=00000000 esi=7b674464 edi=7b657329
eip=7b67708a esp=0019dcb0 ebp=0019eaf8 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000246
HookInit32!failwithmessage+0xca:
7b67708a 83bdccf1ffff00 cmp dword ptr [ebp-0E34h],0 ss:002b:0019dcc4=00000000
1:002> t
eax=00000001 ebx=0019dccc ecx=05a8dc1e edx=00000000 esi=7b674464 edi=7b657329
eip=775d20d0 esp=0019dcac ebp=0019eaf8 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na po nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000202
KERNEL32!IsDebuggerPresentStub:
775d20d0 ff25e40e6377 jmp dword ptr [KERNEL32!_imp__IsDebuggerPresent (77630ee4)] ds:002b:77630ee4={KERNELBASE!IsDebuggerPresent (76fa92c0)}
1:002> t
eax=00000001 ebx=0019dccc ecx=05a8dc1e edx=00000000 esi=7b674464 edi=7b657329
eip=7b6770a5 esp=0019dcb0 ebp=0019eaf8 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na po nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000202
HookInit32!failwithmessage+0xe5:
7b6770a5 85c0 test eax,eax
1:002> t
eax=00000001 ebx=0019dccc ecx=05a8dc1e edx=00000000 esi=7b674464 edi=7b657329
eip=7b6771ac esp=0019dcb0 ebp=0019eaf8 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na po nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000202
HookInit32!failwithmessage+0x1ec:
7b6771ac cc int 3
1:002> t
eax=00000001 ebx=10b514e0 ecx=05b10062 edx=00000000 esi=0019eb2c edi=0019ebf8
eip=7b6580f3 esp=0019dcb8 ebp=0019eaf8 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na po nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000202
HookInit32!ILT+8430(__security_check_cookie:
7b6580f3 e918050200 jmp HookInit32!__security_check_cookie (7b678610)
1:002> t
eax=00000001 ebx=10b514e0 ecx=05b10062 edx=00000000 esi=0019eb2c edi=0019ebf8
eip=7b678610 esp=0019dcb8 ebp=0019eaf8 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na po nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000202
HookInit32!__security_check_cookie:
7b678610 3b0d98127b7b cmp ecx,dword ptr [HookInit32!__security_cookie (7b7b1298)]
根据 WinDbg 跟踪指令，似乎从被挂钩函数调用的函数中调用 GetPropW API 会触发崩溃，或者至少是挂钩模块中要执行的最后一个代码。
.text:10BEC760 55 push ebp
.text:10BEC761 8B EC mov ebp, esp
.text:10BEC763 8B 45 08 mov eax, [ebp+hWnd]
.text:10BEC766 50 push eax ; hWnd
.text:10BEC767 FF 15 4C 9E D3 10 call ds:IsWindow
.text:10BEC76D 85 C0 test eax, eax
.text:10BEC76F 75 04 jnz short loc_10BEC775
.text:10BEC771 33 C0 xor eax, eax
.text:10BEC773 EB 11 jmp short loc_10BEC786
.text:10BEC775 ; ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
.text:10BEC775
.text:10BEC775 loc_10BEC775: ; CODE XREF: sub_10BEC760+F↑j
.text:10BEC775 8B 0D D8 B4 DA 10 mov ecx, lpString
.text:10BEC77B 51 push ecx ; lpString
.text:10BEC77C 8B 55 08 mov edx, [ebp+hWnd]
.text:10BEC77F 52 push edx ; hWnd
.text:10BEC780 FF 15 28 9E D3 10 call ds:GetPropW ; <-- This seems to trigger crashs It's the last code in hooked DLL to run
.text:10BEC786
.text:10BEC786 loc_10BEC786: ; CODE XREF: sub_10BEC760+13↑j
.text:10BEC786 5D pop ebp
.text:10BEC787 C3 retn